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Abstract
Throughout the legal and practical implementation of the European Union (EU) Water
Framework Directive (WFD), subnational implementing agents experience how this pol-
icy works in practice. The feedback, or reloading, of these experiences is an important
contribution to create resilient EU water governance and to further elaborate the flex-
ible requirements of this framework directive. However, a gap exists concerning our
knowledge on the strategies that implementing actors use to mobilize experiential
knowledge. Our objective is therefore to understand the reloading of implementation
experiences in the WFD's policy process, by studying the conditions that affect strate-
gic mobilization behavior of implementing agents. We build upon existing studies to
explore which mobilization strategies are used in WFD reloading cases, and assess
which conditions contribute to the identified strategic agency choices. The main finding
of this study is that the mobilizing agents often use a smart combination of framing,
coalition‐building, venue shopping and timing strategies for reloading implementation
experiences as policy‐relevant knowledge. The choice of such combinations is affected
by agency and institutional structure‐related conditions, that is, a mobilizing agent's
interests, resources and capacities plus the existing EU water governance network con-
tribute to strategic mobilization behavior. Our study is a first exploration of the topic.
We therefore conclude this paper with some suggestions for further research.
KEYWORDS
European Union, experiences, policy feedback, policy implementation, reloading, strategic
mobilization, Water Framework Directive
1 | INTRODUCTION
Over the years, the European Union (EU) has developed legislation to
deal with both water quality and quantity issues. The Water Frame-
work Directive (WFD) (Directive 2000/60/EC) is an example of a pol-
icy with a strong impact on domestic water management practices. It
encourages the development of integrated water quality management
along river basins, aiming to achieve a good chemical and ecological
water status throughout the EU. The WFD is formulated at the EU
level, but needs to be implemented at the member state level (Boeuf
& Fritsch, 2016; Boeuf, Fritsch, & Martin‐Ortega, 2016; Directive
2000/60/EC; Kaika & Page, 2003; Kallis & Butler, 2001). This directive
has often been referred to as a flexible framework directive that
leaves, compared with policies in other domains, considerable imple-
mentation freedom. Hence, important parts of the WFD's implemen-
tation need to be worked out and specified on‐the‐go (Knill &
Lenschow, 2000; Knill & Liefferink, 2007; Liefferink, Wiering, &
Uitenboogaart, 2011).
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The practical implementation of the WFD and its subsequent
interaction with both implementing agents and target groups gener-
ates information on how this policy is actually received and works in
practice (Zito & Schout, 2009). This information, which we refer to
as implementation experiences, is an important type of experiential
knowledge that might trigger policy feedback and influence further
steps in the WFD's policy process (Haverland & Liefferink, 2012).
Implementation experiences are conceptualized in this paper as all
information, knowledge and expertise acquired by implementing
agents, during or because of the practical implementation of policies.
Implementing agents are professional organizations formally charged
with the practical implementation of a specific policy (instrument).
These agencies acquire experiences directly at the (sub)national level
and they, or their representatives, mobilize such experiences upwards
to the EU level. We consider that governmental agents are the primary
key actors involved in implementing the WFD. Hence, the lobbying
role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business organiza-
tions, interest groups and other stakeholders is not the focus of this
paper. The, often strategic, feedback process of implementation expe-
riences is referred to in this article by using the concept of “reloading.”
Policies demonstrating a robust capacity to revise and improve reg-
ulatory frameworks on‐the‐go by learning from implementation experi-
ences show more resilience (Zeitlin, 2016). A resilient EU water
governance policy is especially required in times of climate change. Fur-
thermore, due to the relatively open, procedural character of the WFD,
and the need for its implementation to be specified iteratively, it is partic-
ularly relevant to understand the reloading of implementation experi-
ences in the WFD's policy process. It is also interesting to study
reloading at the EU level, because of the large distance between suprana-
tional policy‐makers in Brussels and implementing agents at the domestic
level. In addition, the 28 member states gain different experiences in the
EU's convoluted multilevel setting (Héritier, 1996; Treib, 2014).
Addressing the knowledge gap of reloading is not only relevant
from a scientific point of view. The European Commission stresses
the relevance of such expertise for improving the practicability and
legitimacy of EU legislation in their Better Regulation program
(Bouwen, 2002; European Commission, 2016). The Commission is
eager to learn from implementation experiences but is dependent
upon domestic implementing agents to gain such experiential knowl-
edge, as it does not have its own implementing agents.
Implementation experiences are recognized as policy‐relevant
information, which can be used strategically by implementing agents.
The choice to reload implementation experiences, or to abstain from
doing this, and how to do so, can be seen as strategic agency behavior.
Understanding such strategic reloading is crucial at a time when Euro-
pean integration is increasingly becoming politicized, the democratic
character of the EU is being questioned, and tensions rise between
domestic and EU governance (Laffan, 2016; Saurugger, 2016). Although
the importance of EU policy feedback has been acknowledged in polit-
ical science and practice, reloading has rarely been addressed systemat-
ically in EU studies (Breeman & Zwaan, 2009; Treib, 2014). The
objective in this paper is therefore to address this knowledge gap by
specifically exploring reloading to understand the WFD's policy process,
to formulate directions for further research. More specifically, the paper
tries to answer the following questions: which strategic reloading
behavior of actors in the WFD's policy process can be identified, and
which conditions contribute to such behavior?
The paper is organized into six sections. In section 2 we intro-
duce the conceptual building blocks we use to study strategic
reloading in the WFD's policy process. Section 3 clarifies our methods
by introducing EU water governance as the policy field under exami-
nation as well as the comparative case study design chosen. Section 4
contains an analysis of the mobilization strategies applied in two
cases, while section 5 focuses on the conditions that determine the
choice of these strategies. We conclude this paper with a discussion
of our findings and some suggestions for further research.
2 | CONCEPTUALIZING THE
MOBILIZATION OF IMPLEMENTATION
EXPERIENCES
The EU policy process consists of a sequence of interrelated stages, of
which agenda‐setting, policy formulation and decision‐making take
place at the EU governmental level, whereas legal transposition and
practical implementation occur at the member state level. Evaluation,
however, takes place at both levels (Figure 1). Policy feedback, and par-
ticularly the feedback of implementation experiences, can contribute to
both change and stability in the policy process (Breeman & Zwaan,
2009; Kingdon, 2014). The feedback process by which experiences
gathered throughout a policy's practical implementation are processed
in the (EU) policy process and affect the EU agenda may lead to a recon-
sideration of the existing policy. This processing is labeled in this study
as reloading. Although some scholars describe the policy process as
cyclical and straightforward, several empirical studies show that it is
iterative and chaotic in practice. We use the cyclical perspective as a
heuristic model, but acknowledge that reloading is not linear and may
impact all stages of the policy process. Moreover, we are aware that
implementation experiences do not necessarily contribute to policy
learning and evidence‐based policy‐making (Breeman & Zwaan, 2009;
Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009) (Figure 1).
Reloading consists of four crucial steps: (i) implementing agents
acquire implementation experiences at the domestic level, (ii)
implementing agents and their representatives mobilize these imple-
mentation experiences across multiple levels of governance (regional–
national–EU) with the aim to set the EU agenda, (iii) these experiences
are received by agents at the EU level, and (iv) these experiences might
possibly affect further EU policy‐making. We focus in this study on the
second step, namely the mobilization of implementation experiences
from the regional level into the EU policy process and, more specifi-
cally, we focus on agents' strategic mobilization behavior (Figure 1).
2.1 | Strategies for mobilizing implementation
experiences
We expect that agents behave strategically during the mobilization of
implementation experiences. They can use such policy‐relevant infor-
mation, for instance, to strive to preserve the status quo, advocate for
policy change, or try to block or terminate policies (Kingdon, 2014).
Existing studies on strategic agency behavior for (EU) agenda‐setting
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and (EU) policy change offer a starting point for the conceptualization
of strategic mobilization behavior. We have systematically reviewed
these strands of literature from an agency‐oriented perspective. Based
on the review outcomes, we identify four clusters of strategies that
are commonly recognized in theories of agenda setting and policy
change. This typology is also in line with more general policy process
theories, social movement studies and literature concerning mobiliza-
tion issues (i.e., Benford & Snow, 2000; Birkland, 1998; Kingdon,
2014; Pralle, 2003). Table 1 presents a summarizing overview of these
strategies and the operationalization used in this research.
The first cluster distinguished is the strategic framing of implemen-
tation experiences. As there is a constant flow of experiences, their
simple occurrence is not sufficient to enter the EU policy process,
nor to influence further policy‐making. Actors try to influence policy‐
making by framing their practical implementation experiences so that
they gain agenda status (Princen, 2007). Framing is seen as a process
in which actors transform implementation experiences into a meaning-
ful whole, sense‐making device or frame. Framing is dynamic over
time and influenced by actors' interests, overarching discourses, pref-
erences and so on (Entman, 1993). Actors differ in the way they frame
experiences to alter support for policies, bring experiences onto the
agenda and further their own ideas. To empirically position and assess
the frames, we differentiate between three layers of frames: (i) an
ontological frame (what is real?), (ii) a normative frame (what is right
and wrong, fair and unjust?) and (iii) a strategic frame (what is feasible,
what can be done?) (Therborn, 1980; Wiering & Arts, 2006). Actors
can use multiple framing strategies to further their experiences. Narra-
tives, for instance, can be used to convince actors of the necessity of
political action or policy implications. One can voice these frames by
using rhetoric, symbols, best practice examples and crisis exploitation
(Fischer, 2003; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Riker, 1986; Stone, 2002).
Furthermore, increasing the resonance of frames can be done by
aligning frames to the existing discursive opportunity structure. Differ-
ent alignment strategies can be identified, such as frame bridging,
amplification, extension and transformation (Benford & Snow, 2000).
Second, we identify the cluster of relational management strategies.
Interaction between actors is important because mobilizing actors are
mostly unable to accomplish their objectives alone. Mutual trust and
respect can enable the mobilization process, and thus trust building
and networking are of crucial importance (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011;
Meijerink & Huitema, 2010). Networks are important for gathering reli-
able information, for understanding other participants' positions and
interests and for spreading implementation experiences (Kingdon,
2014). Another strategy in this cluster is coalition building. It is important,
particularly in complex multilevel governance settings, to gain support,
bundle resources and coordinate activities in coalitions (Battilana, Leca,
& Boxenbaum, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996).
The third cluster distinguished is the exploitation of venues. Actors
strategically choose the appropriate venue for mobilizing their imple-
mentation experiences. Venues are regarded as policy platforms or
arenas, where actors interact and exchange implementation experi-
ences. Venue shopping means that actors seek out and attend the most
favorable venues for consideration of their implementation experiences.
Venues can also be manipulated to push forward ideas and interests
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Pralle, 2003; Princen & Kerremans,
2008), or new venues can be created for such mobilization (Huitema &
Meijerink, 2010). Actors aim to shift debates to venues which are recep-
tive and open to their implementation experiences (Baumgartner &
Jones, 1993; Huitema & Meijerink, 2010; Pralle, 2003; Princen, 2007).
A fourth cluster considered is timing, as actors decide upon the
crucial moments of mobilization. This strategy is analytically distinct
but in practice related to the other strategies. Often, shock events or
other policy momenta, are used to put (implementation) issues on
the agenda, as actors seek to “exploit” the disruption of governance
FIGURE 1 Strategicmobilization of implementation experiences in the EUpolicy feedback process. Grey boxes represent the study's areas of focus
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as usual. Such moments of attention may be short‐lived. Moreover, imple-
mentation experiences can also contribute to the opening of such win-
dows (Birkland, 1998; Boin, ‘t Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Kingdon, 2014).
2.2 | Conditions contributing to strategic
mobilization choices
Various conditions contribute to an actor's decision to mobilize imple-
mentation experiences, just as to the choice of a specific mobilizing
strategy. Following a review of common policy process studies, social
movement and EU mobilization literature, and more specific (EU)
agenda‐setting and policy change literature, we identify three clusters
of conditions that may contribute to mobilization (i.e., Benford &
Snow, 2000; Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 2014; Pralle, 2003). These con-
ditions and their operationalization are summarized in Table 2.
First, strategic choices concerning whether to and how to mobilize
implementation experiences are of course affected by actors' prefer-
ences and interests (Radaelli & Kraemer, 2008). Actors can have different
incentives for mobilizing implementation experiences, such as minimiz-
ing future implementation costs, overcoming implementation problems,
escaping domestic constraints, gaining first‐mover advantages or striv-
ing for alignment with domestic policies (Héritier, 1996; Liefferink &
Andersen, 1998; Princen & Kerremans, 2008). Vested interests, for
example, may trigger the mobilization of positive implementation expe-
riences with the objective of preserving the status quo (Béland, 2010).
Second, the strategic mobilization of implementation experiences
is also affected by an agent's availability of resources and capacities.
This cluster of conditions includes an agent's financial resources,
expertise, legitimacy, representative, entrepreneurial and mobilizing
capacity, as well as personal skills and characteristics. Other relevant
conditions in this regard are an agent's organizational backbone and
position in networks (Dudley & Richardson, 1999; Pesendorfer,
2006; Princen & Kerremans, 2008).
Third, we identify the EU and domestic political and institutional
structure as another important cluster of conditions. As reloading does
not occur in a vacuum, contextual conditions determine an actor's
possibilities and constraints for mobilization (Zhu, 2013). Several con-
ditions can be identified in this regard. The EU's multilevel setting, and
particularly its wide range of venues, channels and other access
points, offers a multitude of opportunities for actors to mobilize their
experiences. As a result, actors can strategically seek out a venue in
which policy‐makers are more willing to use their implementation
experiences (Ackrill & Kay, 2011; Meijerink & Huitema, 2010; Princen
& Kerremans, 2008). Nevertheless, some issues and interests have
easier access than others, as the institutional set‐up could be more
receptive to some arguments than to others. Some venues may be
more susceptible to certain implementation experiences than others.
Hence, the openness of the policy system is another condition that
affects the chances for actors to gain access to the EU policy process
(Pierson, 1993). Attention, both political and societal, is another crucial
condition identified for the strategic mobilization of experiential
knowledge. Such attention can be triggered by a policy momentum,
as policy windows provide a temporary opportunity to reload imple-
mentation experiences (Kingdon, 2014; Meijerink & Huitema, 2010).TA
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Following the original work of Kingdon, the best mobilization opportunity
for policy entrepreneurs, and the strongest incentive for policy‐makers to
respond to implementation experiences, occurs when the implementation
of policy programs brings about unforeseen negative consequences,
which provides them with an urgency to act (Kingdon, 2014, p. 103).
The final condition of this cluster is the fit, or misfit, of an EU policy with
domestic practices and traditions. A misfit can lead to practical implemen-
tation issues, noncompliance or political controversy, which will lead to
stronger incentives for reloading. Hence, this condition is strongly
related to an agent's preferences and interests, which we identify as
the first cluster of relevant conditions (Mastenbroek & Kaeding, 2006).
3 | METHODOLOGICAL ACCOUNT
Water management is a relatively stable multilevel policy domain in
which a strong Europeanization of policies has been observed (Priest
et al., 2016). Since its establishment in 2000 the WFD has given rise to
several implementation challenges (Bourblanc, Crabbé, Liefferink, &
Wiering, 2013; Liefferink et al., 2011). To deal with these issues, the
Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) was developed in 2001. This
key EU water institution aims to operationalize the WFD to resolve tech-
nical controversies and allow a more coherent implementation through-
out the EU (Boeuf et al., 2016; Santbergen, 2013). The CIS functions as
a unique networking venue at the EU level for the exchange of imple-
mentation experiences between the Commission, member states, NGOs
and other stakeholders. Important venues for mobilizing implementation
experiences in the CIS are the working‐, expert‐ and strategic groups. Rel-
evant channels for reloading are conferences, (bilateral) meetings and
workshops (personal communication). As no comparable institutionalized
venue for implementation guidance yet exists at the EU level and the CIS
is recognized as an outstanding example for other policy fields, we con-
sider the WFD's policy process to be an appropriate case. Moreover,
parts of this directive need to be elaborated throughout implementation,
and hence reloading of policy‐relevant information is expected to occur.
A comparative case study design is applied to explore empirically
which of the above‐mentioned strategies are manifest in WFD's
reloading processes, and which conditions contribute to such strategic
mobilization behavior. We have selected two critical cases of reloading
from the WFD's policy implementation process: the one resulting in
the so‐called “Prague Approach” and the discussion concerning the
One‐Out‐All‐Out (OOAO) principle. Selection of these two cases
was done via a process‐tracing analysis of the CIS process, consisting
of a document study and interviews with key actors involved. Both
cases are long‐term processes of reloading in which implementation
experiences turned out to be the trigger, which have been on the
agenda for a longer time, and which have been documented in detail.
The study of these two cases is concentrated on the Netherlands. This
member state has been selected because of its long tradition in water
management, its active involvement in EU water governance and
because it was one of the frontrunners in the establishment of the
WFD. We expect this member state to also be an active mobilizing
actor in the processes of reloading. So, by studying this case, existing
strategic behavior will be identified. In addition, the role of other
member states has not been excluded.T
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The research material consists of 35 semistructured interviews with
the key actors involved, such as staff members of the Commission, mem-
ber state representatives and subnational implementing agents from mul-
tiple member states, NGOs and stakeholder representatives. The
selection of interviewees started with identifying key actors involved in
both cases. Subsequently, snowballing techniques were used in the inter-
views to identify other relevant actors. The operationalization of strate-
gies and conditions was used to develop a semistructured interview
guide. Interviews were held between February 2015 and December
2016, lasted from 45 min to over 2 hrs, were audio recorded and tran-
scribed in detail. I refer to the interview data by using ‘personal communi-
cation’. In addition, an analysis was made of relevant policy documents,
scientific literature, CIS guidance documents, CIS meeting reports and rel-
evant websites. Interpretive observation was also applied by the first
author who joined several relevant EU meetings. Appendices 1 and 2 pro-
vide a detailed overview of the interviewees and the meetings attended.
A content analysis of documents, memos and transcripts was made by
applying deductive coding. This coding was based on the outcomes of
the literature review and, more specifically, on the operationalization
of strategies and conditions (Tables 1 and 2).
4 | TWO CASES OF RELOADING
In this section for each of the cases selected we describe the issue at
stake, we elaborate upon the implementation experiences of Dutch
implementing agents and we analyze the strategic mobilization pro-
cess. A summarizing overview of outcomes is presented in Table 1.
4.1 | Case one: The Prague Approach
The key objective within the WFD is to achieve a “good ecological sta-
tus” (GES) for all waters by 2015. This GES is determined based on a
water body's biological, hydro‐morphological and physico‐chemical
quality elements (CIS, 2003a). However, for altered water bodies—both
artificial and heavily modified—member states are allowed to set “good
ecological potential” (GEP) as an environmental quality objective. This is
because changes to the hydro‐morphological characteristics of these
altered water bodies, which are needed to achieve the GES, would have
significant adverse effects on the body's wider environment and its user
functions. The GEP is a perceived deviation from a water body's maxi-
mum ecological potential (MEP). This MEP should reflect, as far as pos-
sible, the conditions associated with the closest comparable natural
water body type, given the physical conditions of the specific body
(Borja & Elliott, 2007; CIS, 2003a, 2003b; Directive 2000/60/EC).
4.1.1 | Dutch implementation experiences
At the start of theWFD's implementation, the Dutch Government qual-
ified 95% of its water bodies as heavily modified (HMWB) or artificial
(AWB). An exception is the coastal zone,which is designated as a natural
water body. Qualifying bodies as being altered opens up possibilities for
less stringent objectives and of extending the timing for achieving these
(Ligtvoet, Beugelink, Brink, Franken, & Kragt, 2008). Altered water bod-
ies are assessed in terms of the GEP. However, Dutch water managers
responsible for the WFD's implementation, that is, the regional water
authorities and Rijkswaterstaat (the Water and Public Works Depart-
ment of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment), were strug-
gling with the technical and theoretical approach prescribed in the
WFD to determine this GEP (personal communications). Practitioners
described the GEP as: “not feasible in practice” and as “problematic for
dealing with altered water bodies” (quotes from interviews). Confusion
was caused by its ambiguous definition and the unclear measurement
method, because the GEP, GES and MEP are all deviations from the
norm. Implementing agents lacked specific knowledge about the pris-
tine conditions of a water body, reference conditions and its restoration
potential, which were essential to determine the GEP. Furthermore,
these actors found it to be extremely difficult to determine a water
body's initial or potential natural situation, due to the long history of
artificial water management in the Netherlands, and as they were not
willing to forfeit the current utility of these water bodies. Moreover,
they feared that such a theoretical reference situation would create a
relatively high level of implementation ambition (Borja & Elliott, 2007;
Carr & Crosnier, 2005; personal communication; Heuvelhof Ten et al.,
2010). As a strong and collaborative network exists between the multi-
ple levels of water management in the Netherlands, the implementation
experiences of Dutch regional implementing agentswere exchanged on
several occasions and triggered attention at the national level. Key
actors at the national level—both Rijkswaterstaat and the Ministry of
Infrastructure and Environment—considered these issues and criticized
the EU method for determining the GEP (personal communication).
“The GEP measurement method was too technical and theoretical”
(quote from interview). As actors from these two organizations were
the key representatives of the Netherlands at the EU level, they started
to reload this implementation experience into the EU policy process
(personal communication).
4.1.2 | Mobilization strategies chosen
All strategies mentioned in Section 2 could be traced back in the empir-
ical data. We discuss them chronologically. Implementation issues
regarding the GEP had been discussed in multiple EU working groups
from2001onwards. Although guidance had been developed, a common
understanding of theGEPwas still lacking in 2005 (Borja & Elliott, 2007;
CIS, 2003a, 2003b). Timing played a strong role in this reloading case, as
the EU Water Directors' meeting in Prague in October 2005 appeared
to provide the momentum for this discussion. This was because of the
high‐level officials involved, the political attention present and the sub-
jects discussed in this group. Moreover, a presentation by a UK repre-
sentative about HMWBs on the first day of this meeting encouraged
Dutch representatives to mobilize their implementation experiences
about the GEP. The Dutch started networking during an informal dinner
with representatives of theUKandGermany.Coalition‐buildingwas suc-
cessful as these member states shared the perspective that the GEP's
determination method was too technical and because all three are
frontrunner countries in the WFD's implementation. Hence, they were
able to build a common understanding of the issue and its solution. This
solution, a step‐by‐step alternative suggested by theDutch,was framed
as a best practice example (Kampa & Kranz, 2005; personal communica-
tion; Heuvelhof Ten et al., 2010). During the second day of thismeeting,
the UK representative—also co‐chair of the meeting—presented the
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implementation issue at the strategic water director level, which
appeared to be the most appropriate venue. Representatives from the
Commission, Scandinavian member states and environmental NGOs,
such as the European Environmental Bureau, were somewhat reluctant
and wanted to preserve the status quo, that is, use the existing GEP
determination method. However, the group of mobilizing member
states framed the alternative in alignment with the interests of these
reluctant actors, namely that it would not water down the WFD's eco-
logical ambitions (frames identified in Table 3). As a result, the water
directors gave a mandate to the ECOSTAT working group to consider
alternatives for the GEP. Hence, the GEP issue was discussed atmultiple
venues. Four years later, the resultant alternative was agreed upon by
the water directors in the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG), and it
was formalized in the attachment of a CIS guidance document by
2009 (CIS, 2009). This alternative has been called the “Prague or Prag-
matic Approach” and is largely in accordance with the approach sug-
gested by the Dutch in 2005. This approach starts off with the water
body's current ecological status, instead of a reference condition. Next,
to define a body's potential, the effects of all feasible measures are
added to this starting point. The key difference to the initial approach
is that the GEP is now directly based on feasible mitigation measures,
and not indirectly derived from the prediction of biological quality ele-
ments (CIS, 2009; European Commission, 2012; Hering et al., 2010;
Kampa & Kranz, 2005; personal communication).
4.2 | Case two: The One‐Out‐All‐Out principle
The ecological centerpiece of the WFD is the OOAO principle. This
principle is not explicitly defined in the directive itself and can be
seen as a derivative of the Directive's requirements (Directive
2000/60/EC; European Commission, 2012; personal communication).
The OOAO principle is used for overall classification of a water body,
meaning that the ecological status of a body is determined by the ele-
ment having the lowest status. This thus ensures that the negative
impact of the most dominant pressure on the most sensitive quality
element is not obscured. This means that if, for example, the status
of fish is below the standard, a water body does not have a good sta-
tus and the relevant maps will be colored red, irrespective of the
(good) status of all other elements of that body (European Commis-
sion, 2012; personal communication; Prato et al., 2014; Raadgever,
Smit, Dieperink, Driessen, & Van Rijswick, 2009; Voulvoulis, Arpon,
& Giakoumis, 2017). Hence, the OOAO principle embodies the pre-
cautionary principle in the face of uncertainty about water resource
management (Cunningham, 2012).
4.2.1 | Dutch implementation experiences
Implementing agencies in the Netherlands experienced several diffi-
culties regarding the OOAO principle. Similarly to the first case, inter-
pretation variations arose. Throughout the implementation, “we
[Dutch implementing agents] became aware that the principle is not
sensitive to small changes in water quality” and that maps will only
color green when all indicators are positive (interview quote).
“Improvements in fish and plant species, for instance, were not visible
as some chemical substances were still insufficient” (interview quote).
As a result, they found that it was quite hard to see any progress in
water quality. Furthermore, they realized that the effects of measures
taken only become quantifiable after longer periods. These were
important issues as their regional directors, national parliament and
the European Commission called for an overview of progress and a
justification of measures, effort and resources invested in the WFD's
implementation (Raadgever et al., 2009; personal communication). At
the EU level, Dutch representatives experienced difficulties as well.
Maps following the OOAO principle were used by the Commission
to compare progress between member states. Such a comparison
was unjust according to the Dutch, because modeling and measure-
ment methods differ significantly between member states. Member
states having less advanced monitoring methods were unable to mea-
sure certain quality elements and were allowed to assume that these
would be at least as good as the worst observed result for that water
body. As a result, maps for countries such as Hungry colored green in
contrast to further advanced member states, such as the Netherlands
(Cunningham, 2012; personal communication).
TABLE 3 Overview of key frames identified
Actors
Dimensions
of frames Prague approach OOAO principle
Mobilizing coalition with the incentive for
change (both cases: Netherlands and
coalition member states)
Ontological Implementation difficulties due to
technical and theoretical determination
method for determining GEP.
Communication of progress of water status is
difficult due to the OOAO principle.
Normative Aspiration for a more realistic
determination approach with sufficient
support.
OOAO principle is vague, complex and unfair
with regard to the representation of water
status.
Strategic Practical alternative for GEP
determination, no change to objectives.
Another visualization method needs to be
developed as alternative for
communication.
Coalition reluctant for change (Prague: EU
Commission, environmental NGOs and
Scandinavian member states. OOAO: EU
Commission, environmental NGOs, drinking
water companies)
Ontological Implementation issues due to lack of
clarity about GEP.
OOAO principle is applicable, yet might need
some clarification.
Normative Ecological ambitions of WFD should not
water down. GEP determination should
be clarified
Ecological ambitions of WFD should not
water down. OOAO should be strict for an
ambitious implementation
Strategic No or slight changes in GEP determination. No or slight changes in OOAO principle.
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4.2.2 | Mobilization strategies chosen
Interpretation difficulties concerning the OOAO principle were
discussed during the first implementation cycle of the
WFD (Cunningham, 2012) which ended with the submission of
river basin management plans in 2009. However, the issue really
took off in 2012 when the Blueprint strategy was established, the
preparation of a new reporting guidance was started and the Prior-
ity Substance Directive was updated. The Dutch timed the mobiliza-
tion strategically, as these occasions provided a window of
opportunity. Moreover, attention was raised with this momentum
because member states needed to report progress to the Commis-
sion and to their national parliaments in the second version of river
basin management plans (personal communication). The Dutch
mobilized their experiences at multiple venues simultaneously, that
is, in multiple EU working and experts' groups (e.g., ECOSTAT,
chemicals and Data and Information Sharing (DIS)), at the SCG
meetings, and at the EU water conference in Brussels in 2015.
While doing so, the Dutch made use of the traditional North‐West
European coalition. The UK, France, Germany, Belgium and Spain
helped to place the issue on the EU agenda. The Commission,
(environmental) NGOs and drinking water companies were reluctant
to change and framed the issue differently (Table 3). The issue of
the OOAO principle was strategically framed by the Dutch and allied
actors as being primarily a communicational matter. Framing it as
merely a communication issue decreased its political salience and
sensitivity, which enabled support for it to be gained. Moreover,
the Commission's perspective changed when the European Parlia-
ment called for a justification of progress under the WFD, and the
Commission itself experienced difficulties with the OOAO principle.
Eventually, this reloading resulted in the development of complemen-
tary indicators for the communication of the status of individual
water quality elements, which is included in a CIS discussion paper
of April 2015. “Complementary” means that water quality status
remains visualized in accordance with the OOAO principle, but mem-
ber states and the Commission also use other methods. This does
not mean that the issue is settled. Discussions concerning the OOAO
principle are expected to reappear during the WFD's review in 2019
(CIS, 2015; Ministry I&M, 2015; personal communication).
4.3 | Comparing the strategies identified
In both reloading cases, all four clusters of strategies were used by
Dutch representatives throughout the mobilization of implementation
experiences (Table 1). Regarding strategic framing (1), see also Table 3,
attention was drawn toward the Dutch experiences by presenting best
practice examples, and reluctant actors were convinced by applying
frame alignment and bridging strategies. In the Prague case, for exam-
ple, the Dutch presented the alternative approach as being fully in line
with the ecological interests and existing discursive opportunity struc-
ture of (environmental) NGOs and the Commission. However, no signs
of the use of narratives, rhetoric, symbols or crisis exploitation could be
identified. Considering the relational management cluster (2), strategies
distinguished were similar in both cases. Trust building, networking and
coalition‐building were shown to be crucial to draw attention to the
Dutch experiences in the complex EU setting. With regard to the
cluster of venue exploitation (3), agents indeed did seek out the most
favorable venue for mobilizing their expertise (venue shopping). How-
ever, the most favorable venue was different in the two cases. It is
striking that multiple venues were approached simultaneously. This
can be seen as additional strategy, which was not identified in our
review of the literature. Due to the existing CIS network and the avail-
able access points in EU water governance, in both cases there was no
need to manipulate or create venues. Regarding timing (4), mobilizing
agents did indeed strategically choose the appropriate momentum
for mobilizing their experiences.
5 | REFLECTION ON CONDITIONS
In this section we reflect upon conditions that contribute to the stra-
tegic mobilization of implementation experiences. It appeared that
outcomes from the cases were strikingly comparable (Table 2).
5.1 | The role of actors' preferences and interests
Mobilizing agents' preferences and interests are, of course, inherent
to, or the rationale behind, all strategies identified for the mobilization
of implementation experiences. This rationale behind mobilization is
triggered by the experienced mismatch between EU policies and daily
water management at the (sub)national level. The path‐dependent,
vested interests of the Dutch, due to their long tradition of water
quality management, contributed in both cases to their ambition to
implement the WFD in a pragmatic way, yet the EU's objectives were
more ambitious. Essentially, the misfit between the two studied WFD
components and domestic water management in the Netherlands
induced the mobilization process. Reducing this misfit was the key
incentive for Dutch actors for mobilization (personal communication).
In line with this, the Dutch strategically framed in a specific way that
the alternative—and pragmatic—approach for determining the GEP
would better fit the implementability in all member states (personal
communication). In both cases, mobilizing actors framed their experi-
ences following the incentive to change the ongoing implementation
of the WFD in line with their own interests (e.g., policy fit and prag-
matic implementation), while the opposing group of actors framed
the issue in a way to keep the status quo in accordance with their pol-
icy preferences (e.g., ensuring ecological ambitions). Except for these
two groups, little resistance from other actors emerged, which can
be explained given that most states were lagging behind in the imple-
mentation and, as a result, were not yet concerned with both issues
and had less incentives for mobilization (personal communication).
5.2 | Availability of resources and capacities
The cases analyzed showed that the condition availability of
resources and capacities contributed to actors' ability to mobilize,
and more specifically to their choice for applying strategic framing
and relational management strategies. Both cases show that the
fact that the Dutch, and their allied mobilizing agents, were
frontrunners in the WFD's implementation process, had a high pri-
ority for water management at the national level and had an
established position in the EU network contributed to their active
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mobilization behavior (personal communication). Regarding relational
management strategies, key incentives to build coalitions in both
cases were to bundle resources and gain support in the complex
EU setting. Speaking with one voice was relevant in both cases
to convince reluctant actors (e.g., Battilana et al., 2009; Mintrom
& Vergari, 1996). In the Prague case, the UK, German and Dutch
representatives were closely involved in the CIS network (e.g., rep-
resentatives of the UK and Germany were the co‐chairs of the SCG
meeting, having close ties to the representatives of the Commis-
sion), and hence their networking and mobilizing capacity skills
were relatively high. Furthermore, representatives of all three states
were very well informed about EU water governance, had a long
tradition and high expertise in this field and spoke English suffi-
ciently. The UK representative, as a native speaker and excellent
presenter, was strategically chosen to present, and frame, the issue
at the water directors' workshop. Bundling these powerful posi-
tions, expertise and skills enabled the mobilization of implementa-
tion experiences in both cases (Carr & Crosnier, 2005; personal
communication).
5.3 | The role of the political and institutional
structure
We found that political and institutional structure conditions deter-
mine the choice of relational management strategies, multiple venue
shopping and strategic timing. Networking and information exchange
at the domestic level appeared essential to ensure that regional expe-
riences were mobilized at the EU level by national representatives
(Kampa & Kranz, 2005; personal communication; Heuvelhof Ten
et al., 2010)).
In both cases, the venues of the existing EU institutional structure,
and the existing CIS network, in particular, provided sufficient opportu-
nities for mobilization. Venues used for mobilization concerned the
existing EU working and expert groups, just as for the SCG. Venue
shopping across these key access points in the existing CIS network
appeared to be a crucial strategy in both cases under scrutiny (per-
sonal communication; Ministry I&M, 2015). Mobilizing agents did seek
out the most favorable venues for consideration of implementation
experiences. Moreover, mobilizing agents reloaded their experiences
at multiple public and political venues simultaneously to increase their
potential for setting the agenda, which was enabled by the institu-
tional setting present in both cases. In the “Prague case,” directly
addressing the implementation experiences at the EU water directors'
workshop, the most strategic level of the CIS process, enabled the
Dutch to attract the required political attention. For the “OOAO case,”
this water director venue was open and responsive as well, yet it
lacked political attention. Hence, the Dutch mobilized their experi-
ences at the working and expert group level and in the public setting
as well, for example, at the EU water governance conference in March
2015. During this conference, presentations and social media were
used to draw attention. Furthermore, keeping issues on the agenda
in different venues was found to be essential in both cases, as this
resulted in a steady growth of awareness for change (CIS, 2009; per-
sonal communication). The complex EU institutional setting, involving
a wide array of actors, experiences and interests, also drove the need
for collaboration, trust‐building and networking. Several coalitions
were identified in both cases: the strong alliance of Germany, the
UK and the Netherlands in the Prague case and the traditional coali-
tion of North‐Western member states in the OOAO case (the UK,
France, Germany, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands). These North‐
Western member states have a long tradition of cooperation that goes
beyond the CIS process. This tradition resulted in the necessary trust,
familiarity and sharing of policy ideas and beliefs. Furthermore, these
members' socioeconomic characteristics are largely in line with each
other, and all have relatively high capacities for water management,
which makes collaboration relatively easy. Furthermore, we found that
informal contacts between governmental representatives were
important.
Moreover, actors were keen on choosing the suitable moment
for mobilization. In both cases, issues were discussed for a longer
period, yet caught fire at certain points in time (CIS, 2003a,
2003b; Cunningham, 2012; personal communication). In the Prague
case, the 2005 meeting with water directors was the crucial moment
to attract the required attention at a relatively high and strategic
level in the CIS process (personal communication). This was similar
to the OOAO case, where a combination of events created the
opportunity for Dutch representatives to mobilize their implementa-
tion experiences (personal communication). Hence, it appears that
political attention and policy momenta determine the strategic timing
of mobilizing actors. To further our understanding of reloading pro-
cesses, it would be interesting to study if implementation experi-
ences, as a specific type of knowledge resource, can create such
windows of opportunity by themselves or contribute to these policy
momenta as well.
6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this article, we have focused on reloading in the WFD's policy pro-
cess, and more specifically we have studied strategic mobilization
actions of agents involved and conditions that contribute to such stra-
tegic behavior. The importance of understanding reloading in the
dynamic EU water policy process is significant, as the EU is eager to
learn from domestic expertise for improving the practicability and
legitimacy of EU water policies. So far, reloading has not yet been sys-
tematically addressed in academia. Therefore, this study contributes to
the existing Europeanization (e.g., EU policy implementation studies),
political sciences and public administration literature. Furthermore,
this article contributes to our understanding of the unique field of
EU water governance.
Our findings reveal that a smart combination of framing, specifi-
cally by best practices and frame alignment, coalition‐building, net-
working and establishing trust, multiple‐venue shopping and timing,
is used in mobilization processes. As we see in Section 4.3, certain
strategies were not used, that is, narratives, rhetoric, symbols, crisis
exploitation, venue manipulation and creation. Strategic combinations
seemed to be continuously determined by and adapted to the pre-
dominant, yet dynamic, conditions, such as the appearance of a policy
momentum, changes in the (EU) institutional structure, political atten-
tion, degree of consensus and new actors or expertise entering the
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policy process. Spreading the odds across mobilization strategies
increases the possibility that implementation experiences are heard
and that they can affect further policy‐making. The cases show that
conditions related to the interests and preferences of a mobilizing
actor—often affected by a misfit between EU regulation and practical
implementation, and its available resources and capacities, determine
if implementation experiences are mobilized at all. Conditions related
to the political and institutional structure turned out to be of consider-
able importance, such as the existing EU (CIS) water governance net-
work, the water director venue and the access points at multiple
levels that contributed to relational management strategies, multiple
venue shopping and strategic timing.
While this paper's exploration is an important contribution to
better understand reloading, iterative policy implementation and
the dynamic EU policy process, its conclusions need to be
approached with some caution, which also points to further
research needs. First, we studied a limited number of reloading
cases. In addition, although the two cases selected are widely
acknowledged as crucial moments in the WFD's implementation
process, future research should encompass a wider set of cases.
A second point is that both processes were selected from the pol-
icy process of one EU directive, the WFD, in the specific policy
field of EU water governance. This policy field is known for its rel-
ative stability and involves a specific group of expert and govern-
mental‐oriented stakeholders. For further research, it would be
interesting to unravel how policy domain characteristics, such as
openness, the nature of a policy field and stakeholders involved
may affect strategic mobilization behavior. Is strategic mobilization
in other policy domains such as agriculture or nature conservation
influenced by similar or other conditions? In this study we
restricted ourselves to the role of implementing agents, but we
think it would be very interesting to include in future research
the roles played by NGOs, interest groups and business organiza-
tions. Moreover, the prime focus of this study was on
the Netherlands as a mobilizing member state. We realize that
other mobilizing member states may apply other combinations of
strategies as they might have dissimilar determining conditions.
For instance, would reloading be different when studying Southern
or Eastern EU member states instead of North‐Western? Another
point concerns the rational perspective chosen; that is, that the
experiences with policy implementation can contribute to evi-
dence‐based policy‐making, or learning. In practice, reloading is
not a closed‐loop or straightforward process. Finally, we made an
analytical distinction between strategies. However, a combination
of strategies appeared common in practice. Analyzing such combi-
nations of strategies and the conditions under which they result
in “successful” mobilization is another question for follow‐up
research.
Based on our study we can also suggest some tentative lessons
for other multilevel governance systems. Our case analyses have
shown that certain policy actors have strong capacities to reload their
view on what is necessary in policy processes, which gives them the
power to affect the policy arena. From the point of view of fairness
and/or democracy it is a good thing to keep an open eye on “who gets,
what, when, and how.”
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APPENDIX A.
Overview interviews
Date and location Function and/or organization
6/2/2015 Skype Consultant fresh thoughts
27/2/2015 in Utrecht Project coordinator Water Framework Directive at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment
2/3/2015 in Breda Policy official at the Dutch regional water authority Brabantse Delta
9/6/2015 in Koblenz Member of the International Commission for Protection of the Rhine (ICPR) secretariat
9/6/2015 in Koblenz Head ICPR secretariat (since 2015) and former member of the secretariat
28/1/2016 Skype Consultant fresh thoughts
4/2/2016 in Brussels Deputy head of the unit water − Directorate General (DG) Environment
12/2/2016 in Utrecht Project coordinator Water Framework Directive (WFD) at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment
16/2/2016 in Utrecht Water quality and international collaboration adviser Rijkswaterstaat
9/3/2016 in Zwolle Consultant, involved with WFD implementation at Dutch regional level
10/3/2016 phone Policy official involved in reporting WFD, Rijkswaterstaat
23/3/2016 phone German Federal ministry for the environment, nature conservation, building and nuclear safety
7/4/2016 phone Water quality and international collaboration adviser Rijkswaterstaat
8/4/2016 in The Hague Representative at Bureau Brussel
19/4/2016 phone Scottish Environment Agency, representative of UK at EU meetings
25/4/2016 Skype Official at EUREAU
28/4/2016 phone Policy official Federal ministry Austria: national and international water policies
13/5/2016 phone Head of office of the House of the Dutch Provinces
11/8/2016 phone Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, permanent representative at EU level
16/8/2016 in's Graveland Natuurmonumenten (NGO)
24/8/2016 in Paris Head of international and European coordination. French ministry for ecology, sustainable development, and energy.
25/8/2016 phone Wassernetz North Rhine Westphalia (NRW) (NGO)
30/8/2016 phone Federal Environment Agency Germany
1/9/2016 phone European Anglers Alliance and Angling Trust UK
9/9/2016 Lync Swedish agency for marine and water management
12/9/2016 Skype European Environmental Bureau
29/9/2016 Skype Permanent international commission for navigation congresses (PIANC)
30/9/2016 phone Deputy head of the unit water − DG Environment
4/10/2016 phone Project coordinator Water Framework Directive at the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment
5/10/2016 phone Water quality adviser and international collaboration Rijkswaterstaat
11/10/2016 phone Service Public de Wallonie
12/10/2016 phone Policy official Rijkswaterstaat
14/10/2016 and 17/10/
2016 Skype
Water Supply and Sanitation Technology Platform (WssTP) and Water Alliance
19/10/2016 phone Flemish Environment Agency
19/10/2016 phone Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union Germany
9/11/2016 in Koblenz Member of the ICPR secretariat
18/11/2016 Skype Member of the ICPR secretariat
25/11/2016 phone Secretary of the ICPR (since 2015), member of the secretariat
28/11/2016 Skype Consultant on (EU) water governance. Former national expert for the European Commission's water Unit, former head of
European Commission's water unit.
13/12/2016 in Voorburg Former policy coordinator for water and spatial planning Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, and former
senior policy adviser on international water policy
16/12/2016 in Utrecht Water quality adviser and international collaboration Rijkswaterstaat
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APPENDIX B.
Overview of meetings attended
Date and location Organizer and/or event
19/3/2014 in Koblenz Working group meeting ICPR about flood risk management (FD), ecology and substances (WFD)
23/3/2015 and 24/3/2015 in
Brussels
4th European Water Conference
9/6/2015 in Koblenz Working group meeting ICPR about public participation and EU Water Framework Directive
20/10/2016 in Den Helder EU ECOSTAT working group meeting about ecological status, hydro‐morphology, and the EU Water Framework
Directive in general
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